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I. INTRODUCTION 
On his third tour of duty in Afghanistan, just two weeks before he was scheduled 
to return home, Army Ranger Corporal Ben Kopp was mortally wounded while 
fighting the Taliban.1  His heroic actions saved the lives of at least six of his fellow 
Rangers.2  However, his heroism did not end there.  Because he was an organ donor, 
Corporal Kopp may save, improve, or prolong the lives of seventy-five more 
                                                          
*
 J.D. expected 2011, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.  Thank 
you to everyone who aided in my research and preparation of this note, especially Professor 
Browne Lewis.  A special thank you to my friends and family for their support during the 
writing process.  Finally, a most sincere thank you to my wife, whom I love very much.  
Thank you for motivating and encouraging me when I did not think I would be able to finish 
this Note. 
 
1
 Hero Soldier’s Heart Keeps Giving, CBSNEWS.COM (Aug. 10, 2009), http://cbs5.com 
/health/solider.heart.transplant.2.1121263.html. 
 
2
 Id. 
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people.3 One of those fortunate people, Judy Meikle, was desperately in need of a 
heart transplant.4 Now, because of Corporal Kopp’s heroism, Judy says that 
everything has improved since the transplant.5 "I don't think there can be a better 
tribute to Jill's [Ben’s mother] generosity and Ben's -- literally in my case -- Ben's 
big brave heart, than to have his heart keep beating inside me."6 Corporal Kopp’s 
mother explained, “To experience that joy along with my sorrow -- that's got to be 
what a miracle feels like."7  
Although many Americans are not capable of the heroism required to risk their 
lives in the military, anyone can be a hero by donating his or her organs when he or 
she passes away.  Unfortunately, very few Americans donate their organs.8  
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, only 8,019 people 
who died in 2006 donated their organs.9  That represents only 0.33%, or three in 
1,000, of the people who died in 2006.10  This low number has led to a current organ 
waiting list of 110,127 people.11  On average, eighteen people die each day while 
waiting for an organ.12 Often, after waiting on a list for an organ, people are removed 
from the waiting lists because their conditions have deteriorated to the point where 
                                                          
 
3
 Id. 
 
4
 Id. 
 
5
 Id. 
 
6
 Id. 
 
7
 Id. 
 
8
 Press Release, Donate Life America, Number of Americans Willing to Donate Organs 
Rises, But Still Not Keeping Pace with Need (Apr. 5, 2010), available at http://www.donate 
life.net/pdfs/DLA_Survey_Press_Release_FINAL.pdf; 25 Facts About Organ Donation and 
Transplantation,NATIONALKIDNEYFOUNDATION, http://www.kidney.org/news/news 
room/fs_new/25factsorgdon&trans.cfm (last visited Jan. 27, 2011). 
 
9
 Id. 
 
10
 Melonie Heron et. al., Deaths: Final Data for 2006, 57 NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS 
REPORT 14, 18 (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_14.pdf. 
 
11
 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) (on file 
with author).  This number only reflects national patient waiting lists.  Id.  See also Statistics, 
DONATE LIFE AMERICA, http://www.donatelife.net/UnderstandingDonation/Statistics.php 
[hereinafter Donate] (last visited Dec. 10, 2009) (noting that more than 100,000 individuals 
currently need life-saving organ transplants). 
 
12
 DONATE, supra note 11.  See also Alexander Tabarrok, Life-Saving Incentives: 
Consequences, Costs and Solutions to the Organ Shortage, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY para 1 
(Apr. 5, 2004), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2004/Tabarrokorgans. 
html (noting that the number of individuals who die while on the waiting list is often 
understated because usually it fails to include the hundreds of Americans who die after they 
have become too sick to be candidates for a transplant). 
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organ transplantation would not save them.13 In 2010, new entrants on the waitlist 
are likely to wait ten years for that organ.14  
This deficit is the result of two factors.  First, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
and the National Organ Transplant Act prohibit the sale and purchase of any organ 
or tissue for valuable consideration.15 Not only does this discourage donation, but it 
also takes away a crucial property right from individuals, the right to exchange for 
valuable consideration.16 Second, some estimate that 30% of Americans do not even 
know how to become organ donors.17 These facts indicate that the current system of 
voluntary, altruistic donation has failed. 
Recently, Israel, another country struggling with organ deficits, decided that its 
voluntary, altruistic system was not working and changed it.18  Now, the families of 
the deceased organ donors are permitted to receive up to $13,400 that can be used to 
memorialize the deceased.19 In doing so, Israel has become the first country in the 
world to allow deceased organ donors to be rewarded.20 This plan, however, may not 
go far enough towards alerting the problem of organ shortages.21 
A mandated organ donation system that compensates the families of the donors is 
the best way to ensure that people waiting for organs do not die needlessly, and also 
ensures that individuals’ Fifth Amendment rights are not violated.  Mandating 
donation would guarantee the availability of organs, which could prevent hundreds 
of deaths each year.  
Although mandatory donation may seem like an extreme government measure, 
without it, people will continue to die because of a lack of organs.  Therefore, to 
ensure that individuals are not unduly burdened by the taking of their organs, there 
must be just compensation.  For these reasons, a successful system of organ donation 
needs to be both mandatory and compensatory. 
                                                          
 
13
 See Tabarrok, supra note 12 para 1.  
 
14
 Robert S. Gaston et al., The Report of a National Conference on the Wait List for 
Kidney Transplantation, 3 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 775, 775 (2003), available at 
http://www.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118901784/PDFSTART (report on a 2002 
meeting with over 100 transplant community members that addressed individuals’ access to 
kidney transplantation). 
 
15
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10 (1987) (amended 2006); 42 U.S.C. § 274e 
(2010). 
 
16
 Cf. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 500 (1987) (stating 
that a property’s value is part of the property owner’s bundle of rights).  
 
17
 DONATE, supra note 11. 
 
18
 Sally Satel, Kidney Mitzvah: Israel’s Remarkable New Steps to Solve Its Organ 
Shortage, SLATE (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2242791/pagenum/all/#p2.  Any 
comparison between the organ donation laws in Israel and the United States is outside the 
scope of this note and will not be addressed. 
 
19
 Id. 
 
20
 Id. 
 
21
 See Id. The author of the article suggests that the plan would work better if the funds 
could be used for anything that the families wanted.  Id.  This note argues that a more 
effective step would be to mandate donation. 
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This Note will examine the failures of uncompensated and voluntary donation 
and argue that the only way to meet our country’s organ needs is to make donation 
mandatory.  However, because the deceased’s organs are property, the Fifth 
Amendment requires any taking for public use to be compensated.  Thus, the only 
way to ensure that mandatory donation is constitutional is to provide compensation 
to donors.   
Part II of this Note examines the history of voluntary organ donation in the 
United States.  This history describes the evolution of organ donation laws from the 
first transplant until the present day.  Part II also details the consequences and 
shortcomings of the current system. 
Part III examines three other proposed solutions to the organ deficit.  These 
possible solutions include routine requests, an organ market, and presumed consent.  
However, none of these solutions would increase the organ supply as effectively as a 
mandatory donation system. 
Part IV discusses how a mandatory donation program is the most effective way 
to ensure a sufficient organ supply.  Part IV also argues that once an individual dies, 
the organs become the property of the deceased’s heirs.  Finally, Part IV discusses 
why a mandatory donation system would be unconstitutional unless donor’s families 
are compensated for the taking of the deceased’s organs. 
II. HISTORY OF ORGAN DONATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
In 1954,22 doctors successfully transplanted a kidney from one twin to the other 
in one of the most important medical procedures in the past century.23  By 1967, 
experimental heart and liver transplantation were performed successfully.24  These 
medical breakthroughs required individual states to begin passing legislation in an 
attempt to control the new developments.25 Finally, nationwide regulations were 
deemed necessary, and in 1968, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") drafted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
("UAGA"), which provided for uniform regulation of anatomical gifts and defined 
persons who could gift their organs.26  The goal of the UAGA was not only to 
                                                          
 
22
 Organ transplantations had been performed prior to this date.  The first recorded human 
organ transplantation was a 1911 testis allograft, performed by surgeons in the United States. 
Laurel R. Siegel, Comment, Re-Engineering the Laws of Organ Transplantation, 49 EMORY 
L.J. 917, 920 (2000). 
 
23
 Susan J. Landers, Transplants: 50 Years of Saving Lives, AMEDNEWS.COM (Feb. 16, 
2004), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2004/02/16/hll20216.htm. 
 
24
 Id. 
 
25
 Lloyd R. Cohen, Organ Transplant Market Would Save Lives, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 29, 
1996, at A19 (Californians to donate their organs through any written instrument and provided 
that the heirs and executors of the decedent’s estate be obligated to abide by the bequeathal). 
Id.  
 
26
 National Conference on Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Prefatory Note, PENN 
LAW (1987), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/uaga87.pdf; UAGA § 2.  
The UAGA provided that an individual of at least eighteen years of age and of sound mind 
may donate his organs upon death.  UAGA § 2. 
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regulate, but also to encourage donation.27  In 1984, Congress passed the National 
Organ Transplant Act ("NOTA"), which made receiving “valuable consideration” 
for an organ a federal offense, punishable by up to $50,000 and five years in 
prison.28 
A. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act  
The 1968 UAGA allowed individuals to donate organs, eyes, and tissue as gifts 
to a known donee or to any donee that might need an organ to survive.29 Though it 
did not explicitly state that organs could not be given for compensation, it was 
interpreted to restrict donation only to “gifts.”30 The UAGA made a variety of 
advances in the law of organ donation, standardizing the process in each state and 
enabled individuals to donate organs, eyes and tissue to any donee that needed an 
organ to survive.31 The significant provisions expressly allow donations for medical, 
research, and educational purposes;32 give priority to the wishes of the deceased;33 
                                                          
 
27
 See The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UAGA 
Summary, ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, available at http://www.anatomicalgiftact.org/ 
DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=1&tabid=67 (last visited Nov. 24, 2009) [hereinafter 
NCCUSL].  “The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws . . . has 
promulgated the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (2006) to further improve the system for 
allocating organs to transplant recipients.” Id. 
 
28
 Policy Management: National Organ Transplant Act, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVICES, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/policiesAndBylaws/nota.asp (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2011); 42 U.S.C. § 274e.  State officials were concerned that a market in human 
kidneys was about to emerge.  See Walter Sullivan, Buying of Kidneys of Poor Attacked, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1983, § 1, at 9.  “Penalties.  Any person who violates subsection (a) shall be 
fined not more than $ 50,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 42 U.S.C. § 
274e(b). 
 
29
 NCCUSL, supra note 27. 
 
30
 Cohen, supra note 25.  The chairman of the drafting committee was not clear on 
whether the UAGA banned organ sales and thought that the matter should be "left to the 
decency of intelligent human beings."  Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of 
Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 57, 58 (1989). 
 
31
 See NCCUSL, supra note 27. 
 
32
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 3 (1968) (amended 1987 and 2006), available at 
http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/pecorip/scccweb/etexts/deathanddying_text/uaga.htm. Section 3 
provides: 
              The following persons may become donees of gifts of bodies or parts  
              thereof for the purposes stated: 
(1) any hospital, surgeon, or physician, for medical or dental education, 
research, advancement of medical or dental science, therapy, or 
transplantation; or 
(2) any accredited medical or dental school, college or university for 
education, research, advancement of medical or dental science, or therapy; 
or 
(3) any bank or storage facility, for medical or dental education, research, 
advancement of medical or dental science, therapy, or transplantation; or 
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and set out a prioritized list of the next of kin authorized to donate where the wishes 
of the deceased are unknown.34  
It was assumed no organs could be removed for transplant absent an explicit 
consent to donate.35 Soon after, all fifty states had adopted some form of the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act.36 Unfortunately, the 1968 UAGA did not achieve its goal of 
significantly increasing donation.37 This fact, combined with the explosion of organ 
transplantation that occurred beginning in the 1980’s, the recent passing of NOTA 
and the fear of a market for kidneys,38 led the NCCUSL to amend the UAGA in 
1987.39  
The 1987 amendment addressed the changes in organ donation caused by the 
increase in organ transplantation.40 Some of the changes included prohibiting the sale 
of organs at death,41 reducing formalities of executing the donative document,42 
prioritizing donor consent over family objection,43 and allowing medical examiners 
to release any usable organ for transplantation.44 Furthermore, the 1987 UAGA 
                                                          
              (4) any specified individual for therapy or transplantation needed by him. 
Id. 
 
33
 UAGA § 2(a) (1968) (“[a]ny individual of sound mind and 18 years of age or more may 
give all or any part of Iris for any purposes specified in section 3, the gift to take effect upon 
death.”).  The following subsection, however, only allows the next of kin to authorize a 
donation “in the absence of actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent.” Id. § 2(b). 
 
34
 Id. § 2(b). Section 2 provides: 
Any of the following persons, in order of priority stated . . . may give all or any part 
of the decedent's body for any purpose specified in section 3. 
(1) The spouse, 
(2) An adult son or daughter, 
(3) Either parent, 
(4) An adult brother or sister, 
(5) The guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of his death, 
(6) Any other person authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body. 
 
35
 Id. 
 
36
 Hansmann, supra note 30, at 58. 
 
37
 Id. at 9. 
 
38
 Sullivan, supra note 28. 
 
39
 NCCUSL, supra note 27.  “In the late 1970s, the invention of cyclosporin, an 
immunosuppressive drug, revolutionized organ transplantation, advancing it from an 
experimental operation to a legitimate mode of treatment.”  Siegel, supra note 22, at 920-21. 
 
40
 Siegel, supra note 22, at 933 
 
41
  UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 10. 
 
42
  Id. § 2. 
 
43
  Id. § 2(h). 
 
44
  Id. § 4. 
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reinforced a trend in presumed consent statutes when it recommended presumed 
consent for the donation of any organ or tissue from cadavers under the custody of 
coroners or medical examiners.45 Unlike the original act, which was swiftly adopted 
by all states, the amendment faced stiff resistance.46 Eventually, twenty six-states 
adopted the 1987 revisions.47 This resulted in non-uniformity of state laws, which 
was only increased by subsequent changes by individual states.48  
More recently, the NCCUSL decided to make amendments in order to resolve 
any inconsistencies and hopefully encourage more organ donation.49 One of the 
revisions was the elimination of presumed consent.50 The NCCUSL made clear that 
“[o]rgan donation is a purely voluntary decision that must be clearly conveyed 
before an individual’s organs are available for transplant.”51 As of November 1, 
2009, the 2006 UAGA has been enacted in thirty-six states and the District of 
Columbia, and has been introduced as currently pending bills in three other states.52 
Although more states have adopted the 2006 amendments, its goal of increasing 
organ donation has not been met.53 
The UAGA has also been used by plaintiffs to argue that a personal property 
right exists “in the body organs of a decedent . . . giving relatives the right to consent 
to organ donation.”54 Although the “right to consent to organ donation” is not 
                                                          
 
45
 Id.  States were much more inclined to use presumed consent in relation to corneal or 
eye tissue. Michele Goodwin, Rethinking Legislative Consent Law?, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH 
CARE L. 257, 266 (2002). 
 
46
 Ann McIntosh, Regulating the “Gift of Life” — The 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 
65 WASH. L. REV. 171, 176 (1990).  The debate focused on the authorization provisions and 
the routine inquiry requirement.  The prohibition on organ sale was also criticized. Id. 
 
47
 NCCUSL, supra note 27. 
 
48
 Id. 
 
49
 Id.  “The 2006 Act further simplifies the document of gift and accommodates the forms 
commonly found on the backs of driver’s licenses in the United States.  It also strengthens the 
power of an individual not to donate his or her parts by permitting the individual to sign a 
refusal that also bars others from making a gift of the individual’s parts after the individual’s 
death.”  Id. 
 
50
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (amended 2006) § 8.   
 
51
 NCCUSL, supra note 27. 
 
52
 NCCUSL, Enactment Status Map, http://www.anatomicalgiftact.org/DesktopDefault. 
aspx?tabindex=2&tabid=72 (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).   
 
53
 Press Release, Donate Life America, Number of Americans Willing to Donate Organs 
Rises, But Still Not keeping Pace with need (Apr. 5 2010), available at, 
http://www.donatelife. net/pdfs/DLA_Survey_Press_Release_FINAL.pdf.  Deceased donors 
have decreased each year after 2006. In 2007, 8,085 deceased people donated.  Milton R. 
Benjamin, The Miracle of Transplantation, VERO BEACHSIDE, Oct. 15, 2009).  By 2008, the 
number dropped to 7,990. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, At-a-Glance 
(Mar. 18, 2010) http://optn. transplant.hrsa.gov/PublicComment/pubcommentPropSub_ 
259.pdf.   
 
54
 Kathryn E. Peterson, Note, My Father's Eyes and My Mother's Heart: The Due Process 
Rights of the Next of Kin in Organ Donation, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 169, 188 (2005). 
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“synonymous with a personal property right,” it does open the door to the assertion.55  
Furthermore, the UAGA allows a decedent to direct donation of a body part or organ 
to a specific named individual.56 This gives added weight to the claim that the heirs 
inherit a personal property right in the organs of the deceased.57 
B. The National Organ Transplantation Act 
In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ Transplantation Act amid fears of a 
commercial market in kidneys.58 Congress also hoped the legislation would alleviate 
the shortage of transplantable organs.59 NOTA is an important piece of transplant 
legislation for several reasons.  First, it firmly rejected the idea of an organ market 
by forbidding the sale of human organs in interstate commerce.60 Lawmakers were 
worried that a market system would prey upon the poor as a source for organs.61 
Another important part of NOTA was the creation of the Task Force on Organ 
Transplantation (“Task Force”), which was charged with “conduct[ing] 
comprehensive examinations of the medical, legal, ethical, economic, and social 
issues presented by human organ procurement and transplantation.”62 The Task 
Force recommended that hospitals “adopt routine inquiry/required request policies 
and procedures for identifying potential organ and tissue donors and for providing 
next-of-kin with appropriate opportunities for donation.”63 Congress adopted the 
                                                          
 
55
 Id. 
 
56
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (amended 2006) § 11(a)(2).   
 
57
 See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 54. 
 
58
 See Cohen, supra note 25; see also S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 2-3 (1984), reprinted in 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3974, 3976-77. 
 
59
 H.R. REP. NO. 98-769 (2d Sess. 1984);  S. REP. NO. 98-382 (1984).    
 
60
 See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (a) (1984).   This section provides: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or 
otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in 
human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce. 
(b) Any person who violates subsection (a) shall be fined not more than 
$50,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
Id. § 274e(a).  Congress has the power to legislate on organ transplantation through the 
commerce clause.  Since the Supreme Court has held that activity is commerce if it has a 
“substantial economic effect” on interstate commerce or if the “cumulative effect” of one act 
could have an effect on such commerce, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), organ 
transplantation would probably be considered in interstate commerce Susan H. Denise, 
Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1025 (1985).  Regardless, 
whether or not organ transplantation can be regulated under the commerce clause is beyond 
the scope of this Note and will not be discussed. 
 
61
 John A. Sten, Rethinking the National Organ Transplant Program: When Push Comes 
to Shove, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 197, 208-09 (1994). 
 
62
 Act of Oct. 19, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339. 
 
63
 Shelby E. Robinson, Comment, Organs for Sale? An Analysis of Proposed Systems, 70 
U. Col. L. Rev. 1019, 1029 (1999), citing Task Force on Organ Transplantation, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Serv., Organ Transplantation: Issues and Recommendations 3 (1986). 
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recommendation, and as a result, hospitals can forfeit Medicaid and Medicare 
funding if they fail to establish “written protocols for the identification of potential 
organ donors.”64 
NOTA also established the system of organ procurement and distribution that 
currently operates in the United States.  NOTA delegated power to the Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Human Services to provide for the establishment and 
operation of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (“OPTN”), which 
oversees and coordinates the allocation of organs throughout the country.65 Some of 
the OPTN's other duties include: maintaining a national list of individuals who need 
organs;66 maintaining a national system to match people on the waiting list with 
available organs;67 establishing a nationwide procurement and allocation system;68 
working actively on ways to “increase the supply of organs;”69 and coordinating for 
the transportation of organs from organ procurement organizations (“OPOs”) to 
transplant centers.70  
NOTA allows the Secretary to make grants for the planning of qualified OPOs.71 
The duties of the OPOs include arranging the acquisition and preservation of all 
donated organs, identifying potential donors, providing or arranging for the 
                                                          
 
64
 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8(a)(1)(A) (1994). The statute provides that these protocols should: 
(i) assure that families of potential organ donors are made aware of the 
option of organ or tissue donation and their option to decline, 
(ii) encourage discretion and sensitivity with respect to the circumstances, 
views, and beliefs of such families, and 
(iii) require that such hospital's designated organ procurement agency... is 
notified of potential organ donors. 
§ 1320b-8(a)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).  Although the provision gives the federal government substantial 
power to control hospitals and increase the number of harvested cadaver organs, the system is 
not closely monitored and has not lived up to its potential to increase the organ supply.  See 
Lisa E. Douglass, Organ Donation, Procurement and Transplantation: The Process, the 
Problems, the Law, 65 UMKC L. REV. 201, 211 (1996). 
 
65
 Gail L. Daubert, Politics, Policies and Problems with Organ Transplantation: 
Government Regulations Needed to Ration Organs Equitably, 50 ADM. L R. 459 (1998).  
“The U.S. Congress established the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) 
when it enacted the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) of 1984.  The Act called for a 
unified transplant network to be operated by a private, non-profit organization under federal 
contract.” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 11. 
 
66
 42 U.SC. § 274(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 
67
 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(A)(ii).  The OPTN maintains a nationwide system through the 
use of computers to match individuals with the organs they need. Id. 
 
68
 42 U.S.C. § 274(b) (laying out the general functions that the OPTN partakes in to 
procure organs).  This section establishes some methods to allocate organs to people on the 
waiting list, including the requirement that the OPTN "maintain a twenty-four-hour telephone 
service to facilitate matching organs with individuals included in the list." § 274(b)(C). 
 
69
 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(K). 
 
70
 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(G). 
 
71
 42 U.S.C. § 273(a)(1) (2006). 
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transportation of donated organs to transplant centers that participate in the OPTN, 
and determining the quality standards for the acquisition of organs.72 
The nation is divided into sixty-three areas composed of eleven regions under the 
current system, with huge disparities in waiting times from region to region.73 In 
2006 alone, 7,191 candidates died while waiting for an organ.74 This figure 
demonstrates that almost twenty people on the national waiting list die each day 
while waiting for an organ.  
Congress chose the United Network for Organ Sharing (“UNOS”), an existing 
central registry of potential kidney recipients, to administer the OPTN.75 The U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) contracted with UNOS in 1986 
and has renewed the contract four times.76 In 1998, the HHS released what it called 
the "Final Rule," which established that "human organs donated for transplantation 
are a public trust."77 The Final Rule's stated purpose is "encouraging organ donation; 
developing an organ allocation system that functions as much as technologically 
feasible on a nationwide basis; providing the bases for effective Federal oversight of 
the OPTN . . . and, providing better information about transplantation to patients, 
families and health care providers."78 The three main performance goals of the Final 
Rule are "objective and measurable medical criteria to be used by all transplant 
centers" to ensure that patients within similar states of illness are listed at the same 
time; standardized "medical status" categories to group transplant candidates by 
medical urgency; and allocation policies that ensure equitable "organ distribution to 
those with the greatest medical urgency, in accordance with sound medical 
judgment," without regard to their geographic location.79 Though these goals appear 
noble, they have unfortunately been unable to cure the most pressing issue – a lack 
of transplantable organs. 
C. Consequences of the Acts 
Although the 1968, 1987, and 2006 UAGAs, NOTA, and America's current 
altruistic system of organ procurement were designed to increase the supply of 
transplantable organs, none have cured America's organ shortage.80 This shortage has 
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unfortunately led to a global black market in organ sales and transplant tourism.  81 
These adverse outcomes demonstrate the failure of the current organ donation 
system. 
1. Organ Shortage 
The disparity between people in need of organs and the number of organs 
actually donated has been well documented.82 Disturbingly, over 100,000 people are 
on waiting lists for organs.83 Of those, around 82,000 are waiting for a kidney.84 The 
size of the waiting list is only an approximate measure of the shortage because it 
fails to account for the deaths of patients on the lists.85 It also does not account for 
patients who are turned down for listing due to age, blood type, or illness.86 The lack 
of supply of organs is also evidenced by the median waiting period a person must 
wait on the waiting list before the transplantation procedure occurs.  According to 
the latest information available, in 2006, the median waiting period for a liver was 
306 days, and in 2003, the median waiting period for a kidney was a staggering 
1,152 days.87 As organ transplant waiting lists grow longer, the death rates for 
individuals waiting for an available organ increase.88  
Although over two million people die each year in the United States,89 most of 
their cadaveric organs are not suitable for transplant.  This is because almost all 
suitable organs come from brain-dead patients whose breathing and cardiac activity 
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have been artificially maintained.90 For this reason, normally organs can only be 
collected from individuals who died in hospitals.  In any given year, about half of 
those who die in the United States die in hospitals.91 Furthermore, organ donors who 
meet the criteria for donation after brain death are usually 59 years of age or 
younger.92 These factors also contribute to the lack of organs.  However, studies 
have indicated that the number of potential cadaveric organs would meet or exceed 
the demand.93 
A 1999 study showed that 81% of Americans support organ donation.94 
Unfortunately, nowhere near that percentage of people agree to donate their organs.95 
This deficiency adds approximately 48,000 people to the organ waiting list each 
year.96 However, in the past three years, less than 15,000 people donated organs.97 
Without an increase in the supply of organs, the waiting list will continue to grow, 
leading to more deaths and providing more clients for the black market. 
2. Black Market 
Throughout history, whenever laws were designed to regulate or eliminate 
certain exchanges, an underground market would appear.98 For example, when the 
Eighteenth Amendment was ratified,99 an immediate black market sprung up and led 
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to an increase in organized crime.100 As the organ donor waiting list grows longer, 
more people will begin turning to the black market in a last ditch effort to save their 
lives.101 Around 300 Americans travel abroad each year in an attempt to purchase 
organs that will save their lives.102 Though organ sales are illegal in most 
countries,103 individuals facing death have found creative ways to purchase organs in 
several countries.104 Transplant tourism is a very structured and lucrative business.  
Often, companies offer packages including airfare, accommodations, and medical 
care, as well as the organ.105 This development is hardly surprising given the dire 
situations of both the persons needing an organ and the donors.106 Unfortunately, the 
brokers prey on this desperation.  Kidney donors in India earn between $1,250 and 
                                                          
Internet Alcohol Sales, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 297, 302-03 (2002).  President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt initiated the repeal of this law as part of his New Deal Program.  The Eighteenth 
Amendment was effectively repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment.  Id. at 303.  See also 
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.   
 
100
 Igor V. Dubinsky, Comment, How Bad Boys Turn Good: The Role of Law in 
Transforming Criminal Organizations Into Legitimate Entities By Making Rehabilitation an 
Economic Necessity, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 379, at 410 (2007).  “With the advent of this 
tremendous new black market, legal distilleries and businessmen were rapidly substituted by 
organizations skilled in secrecy and bribery.”  Id. 
 
101
 See Organs for Sale: China's Growing Trade and Ultimate Violation of Prisoners' 
Rights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Oper. and Human Rights of the H. Comm. on 
Int'l Relations, 107th Cong. 24, 28 (2001) (testimony of Professor Nancy Scheper-Hughes) 
(testifying that “the traffic in human organs, tissues, and body parts” is extensive, occurring in 
China, India, Brazil, and other countries). 
 
102
 See Eamonn O'Neill, The Cost of Living, THE SCOTSMAN, Mar. 10, 2001, at 14, 
 
103
 J. Andrew Hughes, You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement 
Policy in Light of Foreign Models, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 351, 362 (2009). 
 
104
 See Marina Jimenez, Europe's Poorest Sell Their Kidneys, NATIONAL POST, Mar. 29, 
2002, at A1, available at 2002 WL 17680080.  These countries include Israel, India, South 
Africa, Turkey, China, Russia, Iraq, Argentina, and Brazil. Id. 
 
105
 Yosuke Shimazono, The State of the International Organ Trade: A Provisional Picture 
Based on Integration of Available Information, 85 Bulletin of the World Health Organization 
901 (December 2007), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/12/06-
039370/en/.  These packages are referred to as medical tourism. A cursory Google search 
yields many results.  One site seems to offer kidney transplants for $19,750 in India but claims 
individuals must have a donor.  http://www.allmedicaltourism.com/usa/surgery/kidney-
transplant/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).  Another site makes no mention of a donor or price.  
http://www.indiamedicaltourism.net/medical_tourism_india_medical_packages/dialysis 
_kidney_transplant.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2010). 
 
106
 Kathleen Maclay, UC Berkeley Anthropology Professor Working on Organs 
Trafficking, U.C. BERKELEY NEWS (April 30, 2004, 8:34 PM), 
http://berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/ 2004/04/30_organs.shtml.  “Transplant tourism 
involving trafficked living organ donors is increasingly common in a world where, she says, 
cadaver organs are scarce, while desperately poor people are plentiful and “available.”  
Transplant patients can now buy a “fresh” kidney from a stranger if they have enough cash, 
health insurance and the right connections with organs brokers.  They also have to be willing 
to break the laws against buying and selling human body parts and be willing to travel to 
distant lands.”  Id. 
336 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 24:323 
 
 
$2,500, while the donees typically pay around $25,000, leaving the difference to the 
unscrupulous brokers and doctors.107  
Participation in underground markets is incredibly risky.  Underground 
transactions often consist of inadequate information, a lack of remedies when 
disagreements arise or fraud occurs, and, in organ transactions, desperate donors and 
donees dealing with greedy brokers.108 The donors are often left in an even worse 
financial state after they donate because of medical bills and the inability to continue 
working.109 Comparing the countries of the donees to the countries of the donors 
further illustrates the gap between the haves and have-nots.  The countries receiving 
the most organs are several of the world’s most wealthy nations, including the 
United States, Japan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Canada, and Australia.110 On the other end 
of the spectrum, Pakistan, India, China, the Philippines, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, Iraq, 
Turkey, and the Republic of Moldova comprise the nations whose citizens donate the 
most organs.111 In India alone, over 2,000 citizens “donated” a kidney.112 It is also 
not surprising that Pakistan is on the list because they have no law against the sale of 
organs.113 
Even more shocking, human rights violations are rampant.  Reports have 
emerged from Thailand about patients at hospitals whose organs were harvested 
before they were dead.114 In both Argentina and South Africa, there have been claims 
that homeless people were killed to harvest their organs.115 In China, prisoners with 
the correct blood type were selected for execution so that their organs could be 
harvested.116 
 Black market activity occurs in the United States as well.  Several United States 
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hospitals have a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy when it comes to organ donation, and 
organ brokers know which hospitals to use.  117 Foreign and domestic patients arrive 
with the paid donors and pretend to be related to avoid detection.118 Recently, dozens 
of Moldavians were suspected of entering the country to sell their organs in this 
manner.119 Without a change, neither the black market nor the massive organ 
shortages will be eliminated. 
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
The United States system of altruistic, voluntary donation has failed to increase 
organ supplies and has contributed to the burgeoning black market organ trade.120 
Proposals to increase organ donation include organ markets,121 routine request,122 
presumed consent123 and organ drafts.124 There have been many proposed reforms, 
but this Note argues that the best way to ensure adequate organ supply is a 
compensated, but mandatory, organ draft.125 
A. Organ Market 
In a traditional organ market system, organs are commodities that should be 
bought and sold in a free market system with minimal regulation.126 The regulations 
should be limited to ensuring that individuals are properly matched, determining 
who can enter the market, and assuring that neither party is taking advantage of the 
other unconscionably.127 It is contended that the benefits of such a system include an 
immediate response to the shortage of organs, a decrease in cost associated with 
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maintaining people who would no longer be sick after transplantation, and an 
incentive to encourage people to donate.128 
A futures market in organs is a more radical financial incentive some have 
proposed, claiming it would increase the organ supply.129 The hope is that in addition 
to increasing organ supply, a futures market would discourage the economic 
exploitation of the poor that most likely would occur in an open organ market.130 In 
the most basic version of a futures market, as proposed by scholars Lloyd Cohen and 
Gregory Crespi, individuals could sell the right to harvest their organs upon death as 
a futures contract.131 In return, if one’s organs were subsequently taken, a beneficiary 
designated by the donor at the time he executed the contract would receive the 
contractual payment.132 The thought is that poor organ sellers would not be exploited 
because living donor transactions would still be prohibited, their consent would not 
be motivated by economics, and they would not risk their health by entering such 
contracts.133 Equal access to the organ supply for poor organ recipients might be 
maintained by using the futures market as a supply mechanism but not as an 
allocation mechanism.134 The system, if it works as intended, could provide that 
potential recipients would not be responsible for making the payments.135 However, 
this system still fails to address the issue that the poor may still be coerced into 
donating with the knowledge that their families will be better off after they die. 
The problems associated with an organ market far outweigh any potential 
benefits.  First, Americans have demonstrated a moral aversion to a market in human 
organs.136 One reason for this feeling is the fear that the poor would be coerced into 
donating their organs in an attempt to escape poverty.137 This fear is based on the 
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realities of the black market.138 In countries where organ sales are legal, the poor 
have been exploited.139 Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine that the 
commercialization of organs would satisfy the demand.140 This commercialization 
would result in outrageous prices for organs and effectively deny organs to the 
poor.141 Finally, the ruling in Moore v. Regents of the University of California would 
seem to prohibit the sale of any organs or tissue of a living person.142 Since this 
ruling relied on the UAGA, all states would attempt to apply this ruling uniformly.  
Therefore, a free market in organs would not yield the needed organs, but would 
cause organ allocation to be based on wealth and would be contrary to precedent. 
B. Routine Request 
Proponents of the routine request system, also called mandated choice, argue that 
if people were forced to choose whether or not to donate, more people would.143 The 
mandated choice system would require a citizen's organ donation preference to be 
recorded at a certain point during his or her life, for example, when a citizen “file[s] 
a tax return or obtain[s] or renews a driver's license.”144 This system is used today in 
most places.145 Furthermore, if the number of times people were asked was 
increased, it may be financially and logistically prohibitive to maintain a system that 
records each citizen's organ donation preference.146 Currently, forty-six states require 
individuals to opt in or opt out when obtaining driver’s licenses, and many hospitals 
ask for donations on intake forms.147 
The 1987 revision to the UAGA called for health care professionals to ask 
families of deceased individuals to consent to organ donation if their loved one had 
                                                          
 
138
 See supra Part II.C.2. 
 
139
 Nancy Scheper-Hughes, The Global Traffic of Human Organs, 41 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY 191, 193-94 (2000). 
 
140
 Hearts, lungs, and whole livers cannot be donated inter vivos.  This would require a 
speculative futures market with low value and unlikely returns or sales by surviving heirs.  
Also, it is not safe to assume that those heirs would be willing to sell their recently passed 
relatives organs.  Even more critically, it is extremely unlikely that as many people would 
donate their organs for valuable consideration as would be conscripted through the proposal in 
this note.  
 
141
 See Goyal et al, supra note 109, at 1589 (96% of organ sales were to escape poverty), 
see generally, Scheper-Hughes, supra note 139.  
 
142
 See Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 
143
 See Dukeminier, supra note 123. 
 
144
 Denise Spellman, Encouragement Is Not Enough: The Benefits of Instituting a 
Mandated Choice Organ Procurement System, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV.  353, 371 (2006). 
 
145
 DAVID L. KASERMAN & A.H. BARNETT, THE U.S. ORGAN PROCUREMENT SYSTEM: A 
PRESCRIPTION FOR REFORM, 48-49 (Marvin H. Kosters, 2002). 
 
146
 Andrew C. MacDonald, Organ Donation: The Time Has Come to Refocus the Ethical 
Spotlight, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 177, 183 (1997). 
 
147
 Kasermsn & Barnett, supra note 145, at 54. 
340 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 24:323 
 
 
not already signed an organ donor card.148 There is still debate, however, over who 
should ask for such consent (i.e., doctor, nurse, hospital staff, or OPO 
representative), and whether or not it would work in practice.  Unfortunately, results 
of required request policies have not been successful.149  
There have been several attempts to explain why this occurs.  One commentator 
has suggested that this outcome is a result of psychological factors.150 He suggests 
that individuals may have negative feelings towards organ procurement because of 
its relationship with death and that these feelings impact the legal systems designed 
to encourage donation.151 Emotional issues involved may deter the decedent's family 
from agreeing to donation, as well as prevent health care professionals from feeling 
comfortable enough to sensitively request donation from the family.152 Therefore, he 
proposes that the solution to the organ shortage lies in addressing the psychological 
issues involved in procurement rather than adopting more restrictive legal regimes, 
like presumed consent.153 This solution could be accomplished by educating health 
providers about the need to ask families for consent and by providing training that 
allows them to do so in a manner that respects the family's grieving,154 These 
measures alone, he argues, would significantly increase the number of organ donors. 
Thus, legally mandating that health care providers ask for organs is not likely to 
have a dramatic impact if done alone.  Required request statutes need to be 
accompanied by training, education, and public awareness campaigns if they are to 
have the impact on organ procurement rates that was initially anticipated.  They may 
play an important role in demonstrating that this issue is important and needs to be 
addressed.  However, because most states already employ routine request, and organ 
donation numbers are still woefully low, routine request is not an adequate solution. 
C. Presumed Consent 
Commentators who argue for a presumed consent system believe that the true 
reason people do not donate is because it requires an affirmative action to donate.155 
These commentators claim either that people do not want to confront their own 
mortality, or that people are just too unmotivated even to check a box when 
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renewing their driver’s license.156 Under presumed consent, instead of having an 
option to opt in, individuals must actively opt out.  Many countries employ this 
system with some success.157 Unfortunately, this system is partially in effect in the 
United States with regard to corneas after the 1987 UAGA, and the significance of 
any increase in donation or transplants is arguable.158 Even Austria, where the 
strictest form of presumed consent is applied, suffers from a shortage of 
transplantable organs.159 Furthermore, if people are just too unmotivated to opt out, 
presumed consent is merely a disguised form of conscription without the benefit of 
society understanding the important message that the living come before the dead.160 
If it is true that presumed consent is a disguised form of conscription, it could be 
argued that it violates the Fifth Amendment.161 For these reasons, outright 
conscription would be more straightforward and would allow compensation for 
donation. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
A. Organ Conscription 
In order to discuss the benefits of and problems with organ conscription, it is 
necessary to elaborate on how it would operate.  Organ conscription would require 
that every person, outside of exempted persons,162 who dies under the circumstances 
enabling organ transplantation, must automatically donate their organs.  In 
consideration, each person’s heirs would be compensated for any organs transplanted 
at the value determined to be just compensation.163 The current regional and national 
organizations, including OPTN and UNOS, who match donors would continue to 
operate as they do now.  Furthermore, the implementation would need to be done at 
the state level.  It could be accomplished through an amendment to the UAGA, 
which would then need to be adopted by the states.  In addition, each state would 
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need to create a board to determine whether people wishing to be excluded met the 
qualifications for exemption.  The governor should appoint these state boards every 
four years, and they should represent a diverse mixture of religious and community 
leaders.  
The primary reason for, and benefit of, conscripting organs is the immediate 
impact upon organ shortages.  No one would deny that conscription is the quickest 
way to obtain the organs needed because, through organ conscription, almost all 
usable organs would be harvested.  If two million people die each year, and sixty 
percent of those people die in circumstances suitable for organ transplantation, organ 
demand would slow to a trickle in this country.164 Moreover, at least one court has 
noted that removing organs is good public policy and a legitimate state interest.165 
Yet, conscripting organs does present several important issues. 
B. Concerns 
1. The Fifth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment forbids the government from taking private property for a 
public use without just compensation.166 When analyzing whether a taking has 
occurred, the courts must determine whether a government action could be properly 
characterized as regulatory or a permanent physical invasion.167 If it is a regulation 
that denies all economically beneficial use, it is a taking.168 If not, courts use a case-
specific, multifactor-balancing test that considers the government's interest, the 
scope of the restriction, and the diminution in the value of the property.169 However, 
if there has been a physical appropriation, it is a taking, regardless of any public 
purpose.170 This “per se” rule clearly applies to organ conscription.171  The Supreme 
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Court has adopted the “per se” rule because the invasion would destroy the 
individual’s bundle of property rights.172 When a doctor removes an organ from a 
deceased person and plans to transplant it into someone else, there has most certainly 
been a physical invasion.  Thus, if the government wanted to conscript organs, it 
would need to pay just compensation and show that it satisfies a public purpose. 
Even if the government pays just compensation for the organ conscription, it 
must still satisfy the Fifth Amendment requirement of public use.  The Supreme 
Court has held that “one person's property may not be taken for the benefit of 
another private person without a justifying public purpose, even though 
compensation be paid.”173 There is a persuasive argument that organ conscription is a 
public purpose.  Thousands of people are in desperate need of organs, and the state 
has a compelling interest in improving the public health.  Furthermore, public 
purpose has been interpreted so broadly that almost anything is a public purpose.174 
Seemingly, as long as the legislature says that it is a public purpose, the courts will 
show almost complete deference to its determination.175 The questions become 
whether organs are property, and what compensation is just.  
a. The Deceased’s Organs Are Property 
“In its precise legal sense, property is nothing more than a collection of rights.”176 
Thus, property is often described as a bundle of rights or interests that a person has 
in an object, including the right to use, possess, exclude, and dispose.177 The more 
rights and characteristics an item has in its bundle, the more likely it is to be 
considered property.178 An item with only one or two of the characteristic rights in 
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the bundle may still be considered property.179 It is important to determine whether 
something is property because someone must be named the owner, and that person 
“gets the relevant bundle of rights protected by law.”180 Furthermore, “[p]roperty 
rights both create and protect the reasonable expectations of an individual in his or 
her dealings with others in society.  Through consistent application, property rights 
provide predictable results in given situations.”181 
The problem with defining the organs of the deceased as property is that the 
inevitable question of who can claim ownership of the organs arises.182 The 
traditional view that the corpse was not property emerged largely because there was 
no financial value in corpses.183 Inevitably, disputes arose over proper burial, organ 
donation, and other familial squabbling.184 These disputes often cast the dead body as 
a thing, a sign suggesting that the decedent's immediate family or spouse should hold 
the right to possess, dispose of, or transfer the corpse in whole or in part.185 The law 
fails to provide reasonable expectations or predictability with regard to human 
bodies and their disposition because it lacks a precise definition of the rights 
surrounding the dead bodies.186 
Originally, the common law did not recognize the corpse as property.187 
Ecclesiastical courts in England had province over bodily remains, while the legal 
courts' jurisdictional power was limited to matters surrounding the burial site, grave 
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markers, and monuments.188  The United States, no longer under the influence of 
ecclesiastical courts, “devised a way around the rule” and assumed jurisdiction over 
dead bodies by declaring that a decedent's relatives had an interest in the body but 
only for burial and interment purposes.189  
Later, a Rhode Island court described this interest as “quasi-property.”190 State 
courts gradually expanded these rights, adding the right to prevent the removal of 
body parts, the right to have the corpse remain in its final resting place, the right to 
have it buried where the closest relative wants, the right to refuse an autopsy, and the 
right to recover damages for any outrage, indignity, or injury to the body of the 
deceased.191 Recently, courts across the country have held that heirs have 
“constitutionally protected property rights” in the corpse of the deceased.192 The 
extent of those rights is inconsistent from state to state but generally, they extend to 
the prevention of removal of body parts unless the state can assert a countervailing 
compelling state interest.193 The Utah Supreme Court even stated that property rights 
in cadavers arise directly under the provisions of the UAGA.194 Though no court has 
decided a case based on the takings clause, if heirs possess a constitutionally 
protected right over the decedent’s body, that property right should be protected 
from government takings as well. 
The extent of property interest in living persons’ tissues and organs is seemingly 
more apparent.  The California Supreme Court held in Moore v. Regents of the 
University of California that an individual’s cells, used to derive a commercial line, 
were not the person’s property and he, therefore, did not have a cause of action for 
conversion.195 One could argue that if a living person’s tissues are not his or her own 
property, a deceased person’s tissue certainly could not pass to their heirs.  However, 
at least one commentator has noted that “it is possible that the court's refusal to 
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recognize Moore's conversion claim stems from the intuition that body parts cannot 
be property so long as they are contained within a living human being.”196 Since 
much of the opinion rests on public policy and the lack of judicial decisions or 
legislative actions granting a cause of action, this interpretation is persuasive.197 
Furthermore, the court only attempted to distinguish Venner v. State, which noted 
personal property rights in organs and tissue, instead of refusing to follow it.198 Thus, 
it can be distinguished as not relevant to whether organs of the deceased are 
property. 
b. Just Compensation 
If a protectable quasi-property right exists which courts will protect, then any 
taking must be compensated to avoid violating the Fifth Amendment.  Another 
commentator has argued that even if one’s organs are one’s own during life, no one 
obtains constitutional rights to them after death and even if they did, because there 
can be no sale, organs have no value to be compensated.199 This assertion flies in the 
face of both case law and logic.  Courts have determined that next of kin inherit 
“constitutionally protected property rights” in the deceased’s organs.200 Furthermore, 
just because Congress has banned the sale of organs does not mean that they have no 
value.  In fact, a kidney recently sold in America for $20,000.201 Typically, just 
compensation “is the property's fair market value, so that the owner is theoretically 
no worse off after the taking.”202 Fair market value is difficult to determine in the 
case of organs because their sale is banned by NOTA.203  
It is not fair to say that the fair market value is zero dollars merely because that is 
the government’s price ceiling.  Determining fair value based on underground 
markets would also not be just compensation because underground market prices are 
higher because of the risk of being caught and the difficulty in obtaining organs.204  
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Two possible alternatives are to allow the government to determine the intrinsic 
value through statute or to value just compensation as the recovery of the next of kin 
in a suit for wrongful interference with a corpse.  The former solution, though more 
definite, is highly subjective.  Since there is no true measure of intrinsic value for 
organs, legislatures would eventually need to base their determination on a market 
value or some other test with more transparency.  The latter solution, as noted by one 
commentator, would reflect the emotional distress suffered by the next of kin, rather 
than the value of the cadaver itself.  Though the value of recoveries in such cases 
“would be difficult to ascertain,” it would provide a legitimate starting point.205 
Furthermore, it could combine the certainty of the first solution by allowing the 
statute to provide the guidelines, varying in amount depending upon the organs taken 
and “the nearness of the relationship between the survivor and the deceased.”206 This 
plan would incorporate the best of both solutions and provide just compensation for 
conscripted organs.  Therefore, in order to avoid violating the Fifth Amendment by 
conscripting organs, the states should provide just compensation in the form of a 
statutorily determined amount derived from wrongful interference with a corpse 
recoveries. 
2. Religion 
Another objection to organ conscription is that it would violate individuals’ First 
Amendment right to freely exercise their religion.207 Based on a letter written by 
Thomas Jefferson,208 the Supreme Court held that “Congress was deprived of all 
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in 
violation of social duties or subversive of good order.”209 Therefore, courts have held 
that that the free exercise of religion does not permit individuals to "hurt or harm the 
overwhelming majority of the community."210 Though the lack of organs is harmful 
to people in need of organs, they certainly are not a majority, let alone an 
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overwhelming majority.  Thus, it is doubtful that conscription would not violate the 
free exercise clause.211  
To ensure that it does not violate the clause, a two-tiered exception to 
conscription would be allowed for all persons who believe that donation conflicts 
with the practice of their religion or their child’s religion.  The first tier would be an 
automatic exemption for anyone whose religion does not allow organ donation.212 
The second exception would be an opportunity for anyone who feels that their 
personal religious beliefs prohibit themselves or their children from donating to 
submit a claim to the state board to review and grant an exception.  They would be 
entitled to this exception even though almost all major western and eastern religions 
do not oppose donation.213  
Most Christian religions currently take the stance that donation is a great act of 
love and support organ donation.214 Catholicism especially supports donation and 
Pope John Paul II has stated, “[t]he Catholic Church would promote the fact that 
there is a need for organ donors and that Christians should accept this as a 'challenge 
to their generosity and fraternal love' so long as ethical principles are followed."215 
However, Pope Benedict XVI made clear that organ donation “is morally licit” when 
“spontaneous and free.”216 Since mandatory donation is neither spontaneous nor free, 
Catholics may express some reservations.  Similarly, most other Christian groups 
make clear that it is important to leave the choice to the individual.217 Several 
Christian groups are less enthusiastic about donation.  In particular, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, though not against donation, require all the blood to be drained from the 
organ before allowing transplantation.218 Greek Orthodox Christians believe that 
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donations used to better human life, including transplantation and research, are 
acceptable.219 
All four major branches of Judaism believe that organ donation is not in conflict 
with their religious beliefs.220 Rabbi Dr. Moshe D. Tendler has stated, “[n]o ritual 
obligation impedes the effort to save a life unless it would require one to commit the 
sin of idolatry, adultery, or murder.”221 He even has gone further stating that 
considering the vast deficit of available organs, remuneration to family members is 
acceptable considering the great value of saving lives.222 On the other hand, as 
evidenced by the extreme organ shortage in Israel, many Jewish people believe that 
their religion forbids organ donation.223 In this instance, a mandatory draft would 
enable Jewish people to better exercise their religious beliefs. 
Muslims are deeply devoted to the concept of saving life.224 Sheikh Omar S. 
Abu-Namous, Imam of the Islamic Cultural Center of New York in Manhattan made 
clear that it is lawful to donate organs to those whose life or cure is dependant upon 
receiving them.225 Islamic law would even allow the taking of organs from the 
recently deceased with the permission of the attorney general.226 Similar to the 
Jewish opinion on remuneration, a minority of Islamic law jurists are inclined to 
allow some compensation to families of donors in light of the organ shortages.227 
Islam is as supportive, if not more so, as the other two major western religions when 
it comes to organ donation. 
In a recent survey of the country, seventy-six percent of Americans identified 
themselves as Christians and 2% more identified themselves as Jewish or Muslim.228 
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Therefore, because almost all Christian, Jewish, and Muslim sects support donation, 
it is likely that even with a religious exception, conscription would increase the 
organ supply because many members of religious faiths would not have religious 
reasons to opt out.  
3. Commodification 
One of the ethical and moral reasons for the ban on receiving valuable 
consideration for organs is the fear that human dignity and value would be debased if 
body parts could be sold.229 However, recently, at least one state attempted to 
provide some sort of funeral payment to organ donors.230 Even though this attempt 
failed because of the ban on receiving valuable consideration, it indicates the 
understanding that organ shortage is a serious problem and that, in order to solve it, 
creative strategies are necessary.231 More importantly, it shows that a funeral benefit 
for organ donors is not considered to be as debasing to human dignity.  Furthermore, 
society may be moving away from the idea that commodifying the dead body is 
bad.232  
The concept of commodification comes from the fact that a dead body is no 
longer a valueless object in the law and should be entitled to property interests and 
rights.233 This movement towards commodification is obvious in every lawsuit where 
a relative claims ownership over a deceased body.234 By characterizing organs from 
the deceased as property, it allows for a person’s heirs to obtain the Constitutional 
protection from unlawful takings they deserve, without having to rely upon “quasi-
property” rights.235  
Further, the notion that it is immoral to pay money to preserve one's health 
conflicts with the reality of medicine in our country.  If we believed as a moral 
matter that money should never be exchanged for the preservation of life, why is it 
acceptable to charge fees for the provision of medical services at all?  Politicians 
often speak of health care as a “fundamental right” to be provided to all, regardless 
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of their means,236 but the reality indicates otherwise.  When a patient visits her 
physician in need of an antibiotic to cure her life-threatening pneumonia, she is no 
less relieved of her obligation to pay than if she were visiting a grocery store and 
trying to purchase milk.237 The truth is that individuals are forced to pay for health 
care if they want to receive it, and access to the system is far from guaranteed. 
Accordingly, either commodifying the human body is morally inappropriate, in 
which case the natural extension is that we have a social obligation to provide health 
care for all Americans regardless of their ability to pay, or we should consider 
various forms of compensation for human organs much like we do for any other 
health care treatment.  Even if the first option is more appealing, there is no reason 
why the provision of life-saving organs should not be funded by a universal state 
health care system to ensure access for all.  If health care is indeed a fundamental 
right, requiring that people pay for life-saving medicines or operations is not morally 
any different than making them pay for life-saving human organs.238 
Thus, the concept of remuneration for health care services and products is 
accepted practice in the United States, as Americans believe in exchange systems to 
varying degrees in all aspects of life.  With respect to compensating for organs, an 
argument can be made that government regulation is necessary to prevent abuse and 
exploitation, but it is much more difficult to make the case that a compensation 
involving the human body is altogether immoral.  Since this Note does not advocate 
the sale of organs by the living, many other commodification arguments are 
irrelevant.239 
4. Loss of Autonomy 
Americans have a strong belief in individual freedom and autonomy, to which 
conscription may run counter.240 Many people believe that they should be free from 
government interference with their bodies.  Commentators have argued that 
conscription eliminates an individual’s autonomous decision to leave his corpse 
untouched.  However, the real impact of conscription is upon the corpse itself.  The 
question becomes whether the corpse has some fuzzy right of autonomy.  And even 
if it does, is it so important that it surpasses the importance of saving the life of a 
living American?  It seems clear that since the government already has significant 
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control over how we dispose our deceased bodies,241 it is unrealistic to argue that the 
deceased have a right of autonomy superseding the value of the lives their organs 
could save.  One commentator has argued that conscription would be politically 
impossible to implement, but provides no evidence that it would be.242 Even if it may 
be politically difficult to gain support, in light of the lives that would be saved, it 
would be foolish to eliminate conscription as an option.  Important legislation should 
not be ignored because it lacks political expediency, especially when American lives 
are at stake. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The current system of organ donation is simply not working.  The demand for 
organs far exceeds the supply, and the gap is only growing.  Though the intentions of 
the drafters of the NOTA and the UAGA were noble, the combination of altruism 
and voluntary donation embedded in those Acts are not workable solutions to this 
crisis.  
Realizing this pressing need, several proposed solutions have come forward.  The 
least controversial, routine request, has also proven to be ineffective.  Presumed 
consent, though better at obtaining organs, is really conscription in disguise and 
would amount to a taking without just compensation.  Finally, an organ market of 
any kind would marginalize the poor and create a society where only the rich could 
afford organs, and the poor would be forced to sell their organs out of desperation. 
Organ conscription, with just compensation, is the best way to increase the organ 
supply and save the lives of those who desperately need an organ.  By forcing 
donation, something that the vast majority of Americans agree upon, it would 
eliminate the need for transplant tourism and the black market.  Since the taking 
would be compensated, it would fall in line with the Fifth Amendment.  With a 
simple exception for religious beliefs, it would not violate the free exercise clause.  
Furthermore, it would not exploit the poor or underprivileged and would enable 
them to obtain life-saving organs as well.  No other solution could likely provide as 
many organs.  Organ conscription is therefore the best solution to the current organ 
shortage.  Without this overhaul of our current organ donation system, many 
Americans will continue to lose their lives needlessly. 
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